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O. Introduction
ill this paper an analytic approach towards written text structure generally known as the
clause relational approach is critically reviewed. It was originally developed by Engene
Winter and his associates such as Michael Hoey, who regarded the semantic relation
established between two clauses in text as the minimum unit for analysis. I am interested in
this task since it is the clause relational approach that shaped the most basic characteristics
of my own analysis of written text. By reviewing the theory I would like to clarify the
linkage between it and the analytical method I have been trying to develop. I unhesitatingly
ascribe many basic notions used in my analysis to the clause relational approach, but this
point requires a further explanation.
I have been trying to develop an analytical method designed to elucidate the text writer's
communicative intention. I believe that text comprehension is explained as a process in
which the reader constructs a type of mental representation of the writer's intention to share
his/her view on the world. The mental representation is explained as a predictable chain of
logical relations established among propositions that are retrieved not only from the explicit
parts of text but also from implicit pieces of information supplemented by the reader in the
comprehension process. Each element of the logical relational complex is assumed to be
awarded some status which is defined in terms of its function in the whole complex. For
instance, the complex might consist of elements awarded such status as the writer's
recommendation of a solution, the desirable consequence of the solution, the writer's warning
against inaction and the undesirable consequence of inaction. A particular pattern of status
assignment to the elements of a complex is associated with a specific communicative effect.
The complex comprising the above-mentioned elements, for instance, has a hortatory effect.
Incorporating mentalistic notions such as mental representation and intention into a theory
could make it appear so deviant from the norm respected by many discourse analysts which
emphasises the importance of retaining the surface form of text as intact as possible
throughout the analysis that it can no longer be regarded as retaining an appropriate form of
a discourse theory. Established in the 1970s, the clause relational approach also abides by
the empirical tradition rather strictly: they concentrate on the description of what is directly
observable in the target text. This principle is most evidently reflected in one of Hoey's
early works (1983) which is titled On the Surface of Discourse 1 .
1 It is interesting to note that in 1983 when the Surface of Discourse was published, another influential
book was also published by Teun A. van Dijk and Walter Kintsch: Strategies of Discourse Comprehension.
In this work the authors established the theoretical foundation for the view on text comprehension as the
reader's effort to construct a mental representation using various strategies.
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It should be noted, however, that proponents of the clause relational approach were well
aware of the importance of various kinds of mental operations involved in the processing of
text. Their concentration on the surface form is considered to have resulted from the
practical decision to identify various linguistic signals as concrete evidence for text structures.
Though it is obvious that every aspect of language is related to some mental operation, any
mental representation worthy of serious consideration should be based on linguistic evidence
identifiable in the text. Their insistence on the surface form contributed to the fruitful lexical
studies exemplified by Winter's and Hoey's works and later to the remarkable development
of corpus linguistics that has been advocated and advanced at some institutions such as the
University of Birmingham.
Thus, incorporating mentalistic notions such as communicative intention possibly makes
my theory deviate from the empirical tradition and makes me step into the highly
controversial field of human mind, from which Hoey (1983) understandably decided to keep
away staying on the surface of discourse instead. From a practical point of view, even with
the advantage of the recent remarkable advance in cognitive science and information
technology, it may still be text as a product rather than something assumed to be happening
in the mind of the reader or the writer that is worth describing in the study of text.
Admitting some difference in the attitude towards mental representation, I still claim that my
ideas have derived from the clause relational approach or at least could be better understood
in relation to it.
Though the mental representation postulated in my description of comprehension contains
various elements that are not directly retrieved from the text, I claim that it is possible to
describe it in a fairly consistent manner by making use of a group of well-defined concepts.
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to illustrate them but to identify which aspects
of the clause relational approach could be modified to serve my purpose. I will discuss my
analytical method that will result from such modification elsewhere in the near future. For
now readers are well-advised to regard this paper simply as a critical review of some
important concepts that characterise Winter's theory on written discourse.
1. Basic types of clause relation
Among various approaches towards text structure, the theory originally developed by
Eugene Winter (1974, 1977, 1982, 1992, 1994) is known as the clause relational approach.
One of its most essential features is to regard the semantic relation between two clauses
found in text as the minimum unit for analysis. It has been adopted by many scholars such
as Michael Hoey (1979, 1983, 2001), Jordan (1984, 1992) and Crombie (1985) to name a
few z ,
A clause relation is a semantic relation that is established between two clauses when each
of them is understood in the light of the other. When two clauses in text are understood
as making sense together, some type of clause relation, such as reason-result and condition-
consequence, has been established between them. Clause relations are binary relations in the
sense that the presence of one member of the relation in the text necessitates that of the
2 Particularly, Hoey should be remembered as Winter's closest associate and his contribution to the
theoretical development is represented by his study on the text organisation pattern called the
macrostructure, which can be seen as a clause relational complex. One of the best-known macrostructures
is the situation-problem-response (solution)-evaluation pattern, of which each element can consist of
various clause relations established at lower levels of the relational hierarchy. Hoey (1983) identifies various
linguistic signals for each element: lexical items such as problem and djffjculty, for example, signal the
Problem element of the macrostructure in the text.
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other member in the adjacent context. For instance, if the writer signals one clause as the
condition member in a text, the reader naturally expects that the consequence member will
follow in the subsequent sentences. Such interaction between the writer and the reader can
occur only when both of them share the same knowledge of the clause relation and its
signals. It should be noted that the term clause used in the theory has a different sense from
its ordinary use as the next defInition of clause relations shows:
A Clause Relation is the shared cognItIve process whereby we interpret the meaning of
a clause or group of clauses in the light of their adjoining clauses or group of clauses.
Where the clauses are independent, we speak of 'sentence relations'.
(Winter 1994:49)3
Below is presented another defInition which more obviously reflects Winter's cognitive view
on the notion:
When we talk about a clause relation, we are talking about the cognitive processes of the
mind which come into operation the moment any two sentences or membership of
sentences are placed together for the purpose of communicating meaningfully with the
hearer or reader. The function of this particular joint cognitive process is to understand
what these two members mean in terms of each other within a given context. I call this
cognitive function the clause-relating function. It makes sense of sentences in sequence.
(Winter 1977:5)4
Winter classifIes clause relations into two broad types: the logical sequence relation and
the matching relation. In addition, he also identifIes a third type called the multiple or
mixed relation which can be seen as a composite of the two basic types. Here, I am only
concerned with the two basic types which can be seen as the most fundamental factors for
the development of the two dimensions of text: syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions 5 .
The logical sequence relation is defIned as follows:
The Logical Sequence Relation is a general term for clauses which are related by the
semantics of a deductive reasoning which implies the logic of time sequence or by the
time sequence itself. In logical sequence the meaning of the sequence itself is crucial to
identifying the relation. (Winter 1982:88)
Some examples of the logical sequence relation are reason-result, condition-consequence,
means-instrument. and premise-conclusion.
The matching relation, on the other hand, is defIned as follows:
In contrast with logical sequence, the matching relation does not impose a logic of
sequence upon its members other than that of the logic of comparison. In the matching
3 This definition of clause elation as a type of cognitive process implies that Winter was well aware of the
possibility to develop a more full-fledged mentalistic approach toward text though his emphasis seems to
have stayed on the surface form of discourse.
4 It should be added that reviewing Winter's work, Hoey (1983:19) expands the cognitive aspect of the
notion still further and writes as follows: A clause relation is also the cognitive process whereby the choices
we make from grammar, lexis and intonation in the creation of a sentence or group of sentences are made
in the light of its adjoining sentence or group of sentences.
5 See Quirk et al. (1985:41) for a discussion of the same notions applied to the syntactic level.
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relation, we are concerned with a matching or comparing of people, things, attributes,
action, states, description, etc. (Winter 1982:88)
Clauses in this relation can generally be interpreted in terms of the special formula which is
used to certify its presence: what is true of X is (not) true of Y in respect of Z feature.
When the comparison between X and Y is positive, i.e. when X and Yare judged to be
similar or compatible, the relation holding between the clauses is called comparative
affirmation (Winter 1977: 54). When the comparison is negative and X and Yare judged
to be different or incompatible, the relation between the clauses is called comparative denial.
Also included in this type of relation are alternatives, general-particular, appositions,
contrasts and contradictions. One important feature of the matching relation is that between
the two clauses some types of syntactic or lexical repetition can be identified. The repeated
information in the second clause functions as the constant to cast light on the non-repeated
new information which attracts the reader's attention. This highlighting process is most
extensively described as systematic repetition and replacement in Winter (1974).
A comment that should be added here is that those definitions and descriptions of basic
types of clause relation discussed above obviously differ from typical structural explanations
of similar concepts. Though their research is undoubtedly text-oriented in the sense that
what is described there is always text as a product, the advocates of clause relational
approach are well aware of the cognitive process that produces it. Staying on the surface
of discourse, however, they dare not speculate, for example, what kind of cognitive process
is in operation when they rather mysteriously express it as "the semantics of a deductive
reasoning which implies the logic of time sequence."
2. Predictability of context for a subsequent clause
Winter's definitions of the basic types of clause relation are regarded as the most general
characterisation of the relation between two clauses. The criteria for the classification of
relations into the broad types are simply time sequence and comparison. Classifying all the
clauses in a text into the main types, however, does not bring us anywhere: labelling each
pair of clauses either as time sequence or comparison can hardly be regarded as an
interesting analysis. The value of clause relations as a device for elucidating the structure
of text depends on their specific meanings.
The three main types of clause relation are considered to be the general categories which
can subsume more specific types of clause relation. The logical sequence relation, for
example, includes more specific relations such as cause-effect, condition-consequence and
means-purpose relations. It is the semantic specificity of the clause relation that enables the
reader to predict in what context the next clause should be interpreted. If a clause is
understood as a condition, then the subsequent clause is predicted to provide its consequence.
On the other hand, if a clause is understood simply as an incident, the context in which the
next clause is understood might not be so predictable: the next clause might express another
incident that precedes or follows in time, or something to be compared with the current
incident. Predictability of the context for another clause is one of the most essential
characteristics of clause relations. Winter writes about this point as follows:
Clause Relation is a system of predictability of context; that is, given one sentence with
its preceding context, the lexical selection in the next sentence is frequently predictable,
and this predictability is the crucial part of the semantics of the clause relation.
(Winter 1977:35)
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Predictability of context is explained in terms of the two notions: a strong prediction and
a weak prediction. A strong prediction is where a particular kind of matching or logical
sequence relation is predicted for the next clause while a weak prediction is where only the
most general characterisation of the next clause is predicted. In spite of this dichotomous
classification, it is important to note that the two kinds of prediction should be understood
as the two ends of a cline.
Sometimes prediction may be very weak and then the reader can expect what follows in
the text only vaguely. Such a situation could be illustrated by a question which the reader
might ask after reading one clause 6: what happened after that? or what else? On the other
hand, prediction may be very strong and the reader may have a highly specified question
such as what was the effect of the solution? Similarly in terms of the matching relation, a
specific question might be in what respect are the two persons similar?, as opposed to a
vague question such as what are the two persons like?
Predictability thus explained reminds one of the psychological notion of schema: a
structure comprising slots and their fillers. Unlike the simple image of the reading process
in which the reader or analyst attaches labels of clause relational type to each pair of clauses
one after another, the reader, according to a psychological point of view, brings the
schematic knowledge of clause relation into the interpretation of the text. Such knowledge
might be explained as a chain of slots to be filled with their fillers, i.e. clauses. A chain
consists of minimally two slots, each of which has been awarded some label such as cause,
effect, condition, consequence, means and purpose. When a clause of the text is taken to
fill in the cause-slot, the reader looks for another clause to fill in the effect slot. The point
to be noted here is that the schematic interpretation of the clause relation leads to a shift in
the perspective: from the view on text as a product to the view on text as a process. This
shift in perspective also implies that clause relation might be understood as something to be
imposed upon two clauses by the reader. It is possible that the reader even imposes a
different type of clause relation on two clauses from that indicated by the linguistic signals
though this comment should be understood as simply emphasising the dominant function of
the schema brought into the comprehension process by the reader.
3. Vocabulary 3 as a closed set of linguistic signals for clause relation
3.1. Question criterion
There are various types of connective devices that can be used for specifying the type of
clause relation holding between two clauses. Winter (1977) classifies them into three groups
which he calls respectively Vocabulary 1, 2 and 3. Vocabulary 1 is what is traditionally
known as subordinators such as whereas, since and though. Vocabulary 2 corresponds to the
traditional category of sentence conjunction such as on the other hand, in addition and in
contrast. The two types of vocabularies are regarded as closed-systems: their items are fixed
in number and new items are rarely added to the small groups. What makes Winter's theory
unique is Vocabulary 3, which consists of open-system lexical items such as action, achieve,
basis, contrast, consequence, deny, different, evaluation, fact, instrument, observation,
problem, situation, solution, requirement, truth, etc. The lexical items of Vocabulary 3
connect clauses in a similar way to the items of the other two types of vocabulary. In
addition, they can affect the organisation of a larger part of text by predicting the subsequent
information of particular quality.
6 Such questions are an analytical device called rhetorical questions that Winter inserts between two
clauses to clarifY the type of clause relation holding between them.
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Based on the observation of the connective functions of Vocabulary 3 items, Winter (1977)
attempts to establish them as a finite set of connectives. For this purpose he delimits the
range of lexical items of Vocabulary 3 by using several criteria. One of them requires that
the candidate should be included in the special type of question that is inserted between two
clauses as a connector. One of the examples presented by Winter is shown below:
Example 1
Mr. Wilson appealed to scientists and technologists to support his party. What did he
achieve by doing so? He won many middle class votes in the election.
(Winter 1977: 48, emphasis original)
This example is used to show that the question including the candidate item achieve can be
inserted between the original sentences to indicate the type of clause relation explicitly. By
virtue of this fact the lexical item achieve is judged to be a Vocabulary 3 item in terms of
the question criterion.
However, determining entry into Vocabulary 3 is only a secondary function of this type
of question in Winter's theory. Questions are primarily used to identify implicit clause
relations. In the above example, the Vocabulary 3 item achieve enables the analyst to judge
the type of clause relation as instrument-achievement though the two sentences do not have
any explicit linguistic signals that indicate the relation as such. Instrument is another
Vocabulary 3 item that is regarded as the other member of the binary relation.
From an empirical point of view there could be a criticism on the validity of the question
technique: something which is not in the original text is included only for analytical
purposes. Admitting this point, Winter still defends its use as an effective means of
investigating the meaning of connective items in context (Winter 1992: 137-8).
Even if it is an analyst's invention, the question technique is very interesting since it
implies that specification of clause relations can be seen as a process in which clauses are
named by a certain group of lexical items. The two sentences of the example cited above
are now respectively given their names, instrument and achievement, instead of being simply
characterised as two clauses in time sequence. Probably, what distinguishes Vocabulary 3
from other open-system words is this naming function, which I believe is explained by
Winter in the following sentences:
Vocabulary 3 words refer to their open-system words in the utterance. These open-
system words must be there; they can be explicit or implicit (e.g., deletions can be put
back into the clause). The open-system words look directly at the world; Vocabulary 3
words look only at their open-system words. Each gets their meaning from what they
refer to. Vocabulary 3 could perhaps be regarded as a natural meta-language for the
open-system words. (Winter 1977: 88)
At this point it would be useful to introduce a rather different view on Vocabulary 3
items. With respect to the psychological notion of schemata, which was discussed at the end
of the previous section, the function of Vocabulary 3 will be explained as the specification
of slots contained in the schemata rather than reference to the surface clause. This means
that the schema-theoretic view requires a little more complex process to be postulated for the
establishment of relation between clauses than the reference relation between the surface
clause and the Vocabulary 3 item explained as meta-language by Winter. The Vocabulary
3 item interpreted in terms of a schema is not directly related to the surface clause but only
by specifying the slot of the schema. For its semantic completion, the slot must also be
filled with the information retrieved from the clause, i.e. proposition. Thus, the clause and
the vocabulary 3 item are connected only by the medium of the schema. It can also be said
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that it is not the clause but the slot that Vocabulary 3 items refer to. A further implication
of this view is that it is possible to postulate a schema which has its slots specified by
Vocabulary 3 items but has the slots unfilled with clauses or propositions. Similarly, it is
also possible to postulate a schema which has its slots filled with clauses or propositions but
has the slots unspecified with Vocabulary 3 items.
3.2. Anticipation
Another criterion for entry into Vocabulary 3 is called anticipation. It requires that the
lexical item must anticipate its lexicalisation: the item expects that its meaning will be spelt
out later in the subsequent part of text. Winter describes this function of Vocabulary 3 items
as follows:
One of the most important connective functions of this vocabulary is that the presence of
one of its items in a particular sentence can signpost what kind of information is to be
presented in the sentence or sentences which immediately follow it. Such signposting
function will be called anticipation. Anticipation will be treated as one of the four
criteria for closed-system semantics 7. (Winter 1977: 3)
Anticipation is explained as a relation between the anticipatory member and the anticipated
member. The former is the clause which includes the Vocabulary 3 item and the latter is
the clause which provides the specific meaning of the word. In the example below the
Vocabulary 3 item contrast is included in (1), which is the anticipatory member. (2) and (3)
as the anticipated member specify the meaning of contrast.
Example 2
(1) There is a significant contrast between the national mood now and that in 1964.
(2) Then, despite the minuteness of Labour's majority, there was some sense of
exhilaration: a feeling that new opportunities were opening up for the country as a whole.
(3) Now, this is missing (Observer) (Winter 1977: 59, emphasis original)
The lexical item contrast in (1) tells the reader that in the following sentences the national
mood now and that in 1964 are negatively compared. This specifies the context in which
(2) and (3) are interpreted. The detail of the contrast does not become clear until (2) and
(3) provide the specific information. This specification of the detail of contrast by (2) and
(3) is an example of the function Winter names lexical realisation (Winter 1977: 27).
It would be useful to show a schema-theoretic interpretation of anticipation. Anticipation
is understood as a case where slots of a schema are first specified by Vocabulary 3 items
and then in the subsequent discourse they are filled with the propositions. When comparison
is in operation like in Example 2, the lexical item such as contrast is supposed to specify
two slots of a schema. In Example 2, two slots are specified as contrast in (1), then (2) and
(3) respectively provide the propositions to fill the slots. In this view anticipation might also
be considered to represent the situation of a schema which is left semantically incomplete
because of the unfilled slots.
7 In order to explain the closed-system meanings of Vocabulary 3, Winter (1977,27) presents four criteria
for entry into the vocabulary. 1. The items form a small and fairly stable vocabulary: the closed set
vocabulary. 2. The items belong to the characteristic lexical vocabulary of questions. 3.Most of these
items can paraphrase directly or indirectly the semantics of Vocabularies 1 and 2: the paraphrase criteria.
4. The items can anticipate the coming clause relation by their paraphrase semantics: anticipation seen as
the forward reference of the contextual function of lexical realisation.
A Critical Review of Eugine Winter's Clause Relational Approach towards Written Discourse 163
4. Meta-language
In one of his later works (1992) Winter redefmes his Vocabulary 3 as part of a larger
closed-set vocabulary named meta-language. One of the reasons is that he noticed the
presence of lexical items such as procedure which fails to meet some of his criteria yet
specifies the characteristics of clause relations similarly to those listed. Another reason is the
presence of many abstract nouns, such as opinion and assessment, which characterise clauses
in different manners from Vocabulary 3: they can signal only one clause without logically
predicting another clause. Since Vocabulary 3 items are supposed to signal one of the two
members of the binary relations and at the same time predict the occurrence of the other in
the text, the presence of such nouns causes a theoretical problem. Winter's solution was to
posit a general cohesive function under which that of Vocabulary 3 is also subsumed: the
function of connecting the unspecific to the specific.
The strong emphasis placed on the notion of specificity as a criterion made questions and
anticipations, which used to be regarded as criteria for the entry into Vocabulary 3, two
representatives endowed with the essential quality of meta-language: inherent unspecificness.
Any vocabulary 3 items contained in the question necessarily have to be specified in the
second clause to make sense. For instance, achieve in Example 1 is unspecific and has to
be specified by the fmal sentence to make sense. Anticipation is also understood as a
process in which the unspecific item is specified in the next clause. In Example 2 contrast
is unspecific by itself and must be specified by the next sentences. Though anticipation used
to be given a special status as a unique cataphoric reference, it is not regarded as a special
phenomenon any longer. It is simply one of the cases where the unspecific meta-language
item is made specific by the next sentence.
Winter explains the notions of the unspecific and the specific using the example below,
which, for a reason that will soon become clear, does not include any meta-language item.
His explanation is also cited below after the example sentences:
The division of Germany is rather like sin.
inevitable.
Everyone is against it; everyone thinks it is
(Winter 1992: 152, emphasis original)
In the above example, the notion of sin presented as a metaphor, is unspecific, and would
be meaningless except as potential subject matter if there were no lexical realisation to
provide its specifics in the next clause or clauses. The two clauses which follow specify
how the division of Germany is rather like sin, but without them we have a sentence
which does not communicate because the metaphor sin is meaningless to us without its
specifics by clause. 8 In the full example above, we have the minimal completion in a
clause relation because the unspecific 'like sin' has been specified, and in this case,
explained as well. (Winter 1992: 153, emphasis original)
It must be noted here that Winter uses the example sentences not only for explaining the
specific-unspecific relation but also for proposing a simile structure as one of the criteria for
distinguishing meta-language items from open-system items. Unlike the open-system item sin
8 Winter introduces two types of specification of meta-language nouns. They are: specific by identity
(where the item is named or identified by pre- or post-modifiers), and specific by clause. Specific by
clause means that the noun, in addition to being identified, is specified by clause as well. Thus, in 'The
problem of dealing with criminal is that they are largely antisocial rebels', the post-modifier'of dealing with
criminals' identifies the problem, the that-clause which follows provides specifics by clause.
(Winter 1992: 134)
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in the first sentence, meta-language items cannot function in the simile structure. In other
words, though the unspecific-specific relation holds in the example, sin is not a meta-
language item because it functions as an element of the simile.
Winter's comment on the example quoted above also shows that the notion of lexical
realisation, which used to mean specification of the anticipatory member in anticipation, has
also been generalised as a case of the unspecific-specific relation. Winter comments on
lexical realisation as follows:
At the last resort, all specificness means open-class lexical choice. The term we will use
for the making specific of the unspecific is lexical realisation.
(Winter 1922: 153, emphasis original)
The reVISIOn Winter made in his new theory makes me wonder if it does not end up
blurring unique characteristics of various types of clause relation by reducing them to the
unspecific-specific relation. Being unspecific seems to be a quality of any lexical item as is
well-demonstrated by sin in the above example though it is excluded from meta-language
because of the simile test. Making such a general quality a criterion for the entry into any
type of vocabulary does not look a good strategy. Besides, by emphasising the unspecific
quality of the items, the revision might end up in trivializing their essential feature: they
" specify" clause relations. As was mentioned before some of them specify a vague
sequential relation as achievement-instrument, means-purpose, condition-consequence, etc.
Others specify a vague comparative relation as comparative affirmation, comparative denial, etc.
This rather confusing discussion seems to have arisen from the dual meanings in which
the term specific or unspecific is used. This point can be explained in terms of the schema
we have been considering. When Winter says that all the meta-language items are
unspecific, he is interpreted as saying that they simply name the slots of schemata which
must be filled with fillers or propositions for semantic completeness. When I wrote above
that meta-language items specify clause relations, I meant that by virtue of the semantics of
these items the specification of one slot predicts how subsequent slots are specified. It might
be said that Winter's comment on specification is about the paradigmatic relation between the
slot and its filler while my comment is about the syntagmatic relation between the two slots.
One of the reasons for the revision of the theory was the presence of nouns such as
opinion, which according to Winter refer to only one clause and do not seem to specify the
logical context for another clause. His solution to this problem was to postulate the general
function, unspecific-specific, which seems to cover the semantics of all the abstract nouns.
With due respect to Winter's judgement on the lack of predictable clauses, I think that meta-
language nouns such as opinion will be better incorporated into the theory of clause relations
by emphasising their ability to predict other clauses in text: for example, the opinion clause
predicts another clause functioning as its ground or its alternative. As was discussed before,
predictability is a cline or continuum: the two broad types of clause relations, logical
sequence and matching, are seen as the most general predictions about the next clause while
Vocabulary 3 items such as contrast and result strongly predict the characteristics of
subsequent clauses. Since clauses vary in their potential for logical connection with other
clauses, it is natural to think that some of them have no or relatively weak potential for the
logical connection with another clause. Accordingly, it is naturally assumed that there are
lexical items (e.g. opinion) to refer to such clauses with weak potential. 9
9 It should be added that in Winter (1994: 50) the unspecific-specific is explained as one type of
comparative affirmation. Comparatine affirmation also includes general-particular and appositions.
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5. Basic text structures
Winter refers to clause relations among more than two clauses as a larger clause relation.
One of the examples can be seen in Example 2 where the anticipatory member, (1), is
lexically realised by the anticipated member, (2) and (3), which are on their own in a clause
relation of comparative denial. A larger clause relation sometimes constructs a coherent
whole as message. In such a case, it can be regarded as a text/discourse structure, which
is discussed in this section. Though each element of a text structure often comprises
multiple clauses in a hierarchical manner, it can also be only one clause. Winter explains
discourse structures as follows:
We have a mutually expected text structuring or linguistic consensus about the beginning
and the end of the structures with which we all comply when communicating with others.
(Winter 1994: 55 emphasis original)
Winter proposes two types of text structure Situation-Evaluation and Hypothetical-Real. The
first is defined as follows:
Fundamentally, this text structure is the old commonplace of saying what you know about
something (the facts = the Situation for an identified X) and then saying what you think
or feel about it (the interpretation of the facts = Evaluation of Situation for X, or the
Evaluation of X in this Situation).... We communicate in terms of the notion of Situation
as a meaningful linguistic context which we may interpret for the decoder.
(Winter 1994: 57)
It should be emphasised here that Winter defines the Situation element as facts, that is, the
real situation. Situation-Evaluation has two subtypes which are regarded as more developed
and complex forms: Situation-Evaluation-Basis/Reason and Situation-Problem-Solution-
Evaluation. The S-P-R-E patternlO , which is best-known of all the text structures so far
identified in the field, is explained by Winter as follows:
I might add that the most fully developed from of this text structure could have the
addition of the elements of Problem-Solution, each with their own Evaluation elements as
an aspect of the Situation element in the simplified four-part structure of Situation-
Problem-Solution-Evaluation. (Winter 1994: 57, emphasis original)
This quotation means that the S-P-R-E sequence is a simplified version of a more fully
expressed one. Hoey (1983:55) describes the fully expressed version of the pattern III a
diagram shown below:
Situation Evaluation of Situation as non-Problem
I
Situation - Evaluation of Situation as Problem
I
Situation - Evaluation of Situation as Response
I
Situation - Evaluation of New Situation as Result
I
Evaluation
10 For the most comprehensive description of the S-P-R-E pattern, see Hoey (1979,1983).
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Evaluation is a very general notion since ultimately even a selection of a lexical item could
be taken to include some personal judgement or evaluation on the part of the language user.
In the diagram above Problem, for example, is defined as a situation that is evaluated as
such, and Response (often also understood as Solution) is defined as a situation that is
evaluated as such. This view on Problem and Solution is also reflected in the following
comment taken from a conversation Winter remembers having with one of his associates
Jordan:
In a conversation with me, Jordan noted in passing that the one-word road sign 'Danger'
is an Evaluation of the real Situation for the motorist implying a Problem whose Solution
is avoidance. (Winter 1994: 62)
In this case, a real situation of the road (e.g. an acute curve in the road) was evaluated by
the person who made the sign as danger, i.e. a type of problem while the situation in which
the driver is alerted and takes some avoidance action (e.g. slowingdown) is evaluated as a
solution. To complete this process, it could be added that the new situation where the driver
safely passes the section is implied to be evaluated as the result.
The second text structure, Hypothetical-Real, presents a hypothesis about the likely facts
or Situation. It is described in contrast with the Situation-Evaluation structure as follows:
Unlike the Situation and Evaluation structure whose Situation presents something which
"exists" within the knowledge or experience of the encoder and perhaps shared with his
decoders, we are speaking of the role of the encoder where the Situation is not known
or controversial. In such a case, the Situation becomes the Hypothesis which the encoder
has to signal explicitly as hypothetical, and do likewise when s/he is repeating somebody
else's statement in order to communicate it. (Winter 1994: 62)
This structure is based on the matching relation and has several developed patterns according
to whether the comparison is affirmative or negative. When the comparison is affirmative,
the pattern develops as Hypothetical-Affirmation-Basis/Reason. If the comparison is negative,
the structure becomes Hypothetical-Denial-Correction-Basis/Reason and Hypothetical-Denial-
Basis for Denial.
One of the examples of the structure is quoted below:
Example 3
The engineers expected that the earthquake would have caused damage to their
underground tunnel. It did; it was at least the magnitude of 6 on the Richter Scale.
(Winter 1994: 64 emphasis original)
In this example the Hypothetical-Affirmation is identified. The information contained in
that-clause of the first sentence, the earthquake would have caused damage to their
underground tunnel, is not a situation or fact but only an expectation, i.e. a type of
hypothetical information. It is later affirmed as a fact in the second sentence.
One point should be noted about the meaning of the term hypothetical. Winter shows
examples of linguistic signals for the hypothetical element: assertion, assumption, belief,
claim, conclusion, expect, feel, guess, illusion, imagine, proposition, rumour, speculation,
suggestion, suppose, theory, think, etc. Looking at the list one notices that all words
included are associated with possibility or epistemicity: there are no items associated with
deontic features. The definition of the structure, however, seems to be similarly applied to
a type of text where deontic situation is compared with facts or reality. It is not clear
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whether Winter includes the following text as one of the example of the H-R structure:
Example 4
(1)The extremists have been urging Mr. Smith to "do something". (2) He has done
something. (3) He has taken measures which could make Rhodesia almost
totalitarian (Observer) (Winter 1977: 71, emphasis original)
Winter's original purpose of this text is to show the chataphoric function of (2) and its
lexical realisation in (3). This example, however, can also be seen as affirmation by (2) of
the hypothetical information expressed in (1): Mr Smith does something. (3) provides
affirmatory particular. The hypothetical feature of this text is assigned to (1) by urging,
which includes deontic meaning should in its semantics. Similarity between Examples 3 and
4 is due to the underlying clause relation: comparative affirmation. The difference is that at
the point where the hypothesis was made, the engineers hypothesised about a situation which
had already existed in the real world whereas the extremists did about a situation which had
not existed yet.
The discussion in this section also has some implication for our schema: it can consist
of many slots that establish syntagmatic and paradigmatic relation among themselves. The
specification of each slot might be understood as a type of evaluation with the use of meta-
language items since the slots are specified as problem, response, etc just as the clauses of
text structures are evaluated as problem, response, etc.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have reviewed several concepts that are essential building blocks of
Eugine Winter's theory of discourse analysis known as the clause relational approach.
Throughout the work I have become more confident about the possibility to modify it in
such a way that it can be applied for the description of mental representations that the reader
is assumed to construct in comprehension. As was mentioned in Introduction, Mental
representation has remained something that can safely be averted by most linguists as is also
evidenced by the title of Hoey's book On the Surface of Discourse. Winter's description of
the theory, however, abounds in various cognitive and mentalistic concepts: for instance, the
most fundamental concept of the theory, clause relation, is defined as a type of cognitive
process as was discussed in Section 1.
With due respect to the great achievement by the proponents particularly in the field of
lexical studies, which is not the least ascribable to their decision to stick to the surface form
of text as much as possible, one dilemma I feel is that the restriction such as keeping the
surface form intact in the analysis sometimes seems to lead to a rather undesirable
consequence spoiling the chance of more dynamic interpretation of text. One of such cases
is found in the definition of logical sequence relation. Though the relation between two
clauses is explained as that of time sequence, such a simple explanation is not good enough
to justify the use of the term logical. It is important to defme what kind of logic underlies
the relation and to explain why the presence of one member in text predicts that of the other
in a more satisfactory manner. For this purpose, however, one cannot keep on staying on
the surface of discourse. With respect to this point, it is interesting to see Winter's comment
on the combination of "deductive reasoning" and "matching" which underlies concession
relation (Winter: 1994,55). In his explanation of the concession relation found between a
pair of clauses I'm not rich and yet I am happy, Winter assumes the "unexpressed" clause
I am not happy which has been denied by I am happy. As is often the case with his
writing, this explanation of the clause relation implies that Winter has stepped into the field
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of mind.
As I stated before my purpose of reviewing Winter's work was to see which aspects of his
theory could be adjusted for the description of mental representations. The concepts of his
theory I discussed in this paper are all related to some aspects of the model that I have been
designing for that purpose. I presented its very sketchy outline in Introduction and in each
section tried to interpret Winter's concepts in terms of the notion of schema. I need more
time before I can discuss how they are actually modified to fit in my model.
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